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| 5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish between what is certain and what is necessary; everyone agrees that future contingents are certain, since God foresees them, but it is not thereby admitted that they are necessary. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §13) | |
| A reaction: An interesting point, since there is presumably a difference between God foreseeing that future squares will have four corners, and His foreseeing the next war. It seems to me, though, that 'certainty' is bad enough news for free will, without necessity. |
| 2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: People try to safeguard God's freedom, as though it were not freedom of the highest sort to act in perfection following sovereign reason. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §03) |