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Ideas for 'works', 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix' and 'Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science'

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2 ideas

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
     Full Idea: Every idea is derived from preceding impressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense.
     From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix)
     A reaction: This spells out with beautiful simplicity how his empiricist assumptions lead him to this sceptical view. No logical positivist could reject this thought. Personally I favour empiricism with added inference to the best explanation.
Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
     Full Idea: Suppose an oyster to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Do you consider any thing but merely that perception? Have you any notion of self or substance? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion.
     From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix)
     A reaction: A splendid addition to his earlier sceptical thinking. We could form a different conclusion. Suppose I do have a self. If my multitudinous perceptions were reduced to a single perception of agonising pain, would that remove the self?