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2 ideas
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I see the sun, it does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person, but we must be acquainted with that thing which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. I personally believe that I have a very clear personal identity as I write this, but I do not believe that there is a strict identity with the person who wrote similar comments three years ago. So how do I change 'my' mind? |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I am acquainted with 'my seeing the sun', it seems plain that on the one hand there is the sense-datum which represents the sun to me, on the other hand there is that which sees this sense-datum. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This appears to flatly contradict Hume's scepticism about seeing his 'self', but maybe Russell is only aware of his body, and then fictionalises a 'self' as the controller of this body. But I agree with Russell. I am the thing that cares about the sun. |