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3 ideas
| 1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4) | |
| A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma. |
| 1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria. | |
| From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible? |
| 22131 | The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus said the will is a power for opposites, in the sense that even when actually willing one thing, it retains a real, active power to will the opposite. He detaches the idea of freedom from time and variability. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: In the sense that we can abandon an action when in the middle of it, this seems to be correct. Not just 'I could have done otherwise', but 'I don't have to be doing this'. This shows that the will has wide power, but not that it is 'free'. |