display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any and every circumstance that could be thought of would compel us to will it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be willed except good, but many and various things are good, and you can't conclude from this that wills are compelled to choose this or that one. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 05) |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 24) |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning powers can entertain opposite objects. Now will is a reasoning power, so will can entertain opposites and is not compelled to embrace one of them. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.x2) |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will is not compelled to move, for it doesn't have to want the pleasant things set before it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 21) |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Because will moves itself by deliberation - a kind of investigation which doesn't prove some one way correct but examines the alternatives - will doesn't compel itself to will. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: We are forced to admit that, in any will that is not always willing, the very first movement to will must come from outside, stimulating the will to start willing. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
| A reaction: cf Nietzsche |