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2 ideas
21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Man is not merely a part (the higher part) of the Soul but the total. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12) | |
A reaction: The soul is psuche, which includes the vegetative soul. The higher part is normally taken to be reason. This seems pretty close to John Locke's view of the matter. |
7946 | The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The memory criterion for personal identity permits 'branching' (where two things can later meet the criteria of persistence of a single earlier thing), which presents it with serious problems. | |
From: report of Bernard Williams (Personal Identity and Individuation [1956]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Of course, any notion of personal identity would have serious problem if people could branch into two, like fissioning amoeba. If that happened, we probably wouldn't have had a strong notion of personal identity in the first place. See Parfit. |