Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Problem of the Soul', 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' and 'Varieties of Causation'

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2 ideas

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
     Full Idea: We only have a sense of our self as continuous, but not as exactly the same.
     From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.178)
     A reaction: Russell said this too, and it seems to me to be right. Personal identity is far too imprecise for me to assert that I remember my ten-year-old self as being identical to me now. Only physical objects like teddy bears can pass that test.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Every human language appears to have a word or expression equivalent to the English word 'I'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: If this is true (what is his evidence?) I take it to be very significant support for what I take to be obvious anyway, that the mind/brain has a central controlling core, which understands and decides, and which is the most valued part of us.