Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Principles of Philosophy', 'Introspection' and 'Individuals in Aristotle'

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4 ideas

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395)
     A reaction: The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them.
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396)
     A reaction: Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Because each one of us understands what he thinks, and that in thinking he can shut himself off from every other substance, we may conclude that each of us is really distinct from every other thinking substance and from corporeal substance.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
     A reaction: This seems to be a novel argument which requires elucidation. I can 'shut myself off from every other substance'? If I shut myself off from thinking about food, does that mean hunger is not part of me? Or convince yourself that you don't have a brother?
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that can give or withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most common notions found innately in us.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.39)
     A reaction: It seems to me plausible to say that we have an innate conception of our own will (our ability to make decisions), though Hume says we only learn about the will from experience, but the idea that it is absolutely 'free' might never cross our minds.