7117
|
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
|
|
Full Idea:
If the 'I' is part of consciousness, there will be two I's: the reflective and the reflected. ...but it is unacceptable for any communication to be established between the reflective I and the reflected I, if they are real elements of consciousness.
|
|
From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
|
|
A reaction:
If we accept that there are two orders of consciousness (reflective, about itself, and reflected, about the world) it seems reasonable to say that there cannot be an 'I' in both of them. A nice, and intriguing, argument.
|
22225
|
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
|
|
Full Idea:
My I, in efffect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.
|
|
From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], p.104), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.1
|
|
A reaction:
Not sure how to assess this. Other people seem just as real as I do, when I encounter them, as friend or as foe. And in dealing with them we act as if dealing with their Self (rather than their legs, say). So this idea seems a good one.
|
5689
|
Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
|
|
Full Idea:
Freud persuaded many that beliefs, wishes and feelings are sometimes unconscious, and even sceptics about Freud acknowledge that there is self-deception about motive and attitudes.
|
|
From:
report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection p.396
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to me obviously correct. The traditional notion is that the consciousness is the mind, but now it seems obvious that consciousness is only one part of the mind, and maybe even a peripheral (epiphenomenal) part of it.
|