display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: The self, if it is not to be treated as a metaphysical entity, must be held to be a logical construction out of sense-experiences. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: It is striking how people differ in their reports when they try to see the self by introspection. The self could be beyond sense-experience, and yet still be the best explanation of what we actually DO experience. It is a 'transcendental sensation'? |
| 5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: For any two sense-experiences to belong to the sense-history of the same self it is necessary and sufficient that they should contain organic sense-contents which are elements of the same body. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: This makes more sense if you are a realist about organic bodies, but less sense if (like Ayer) you define the body in terms of sense-experiences. It is a stab at what is now called 'animalism', but needs an account of brain transplant thought-experiments. |
| 5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: We have solved Hume's problem by defining personal identity in terms of bodily identity, and bodily identity is to be defined in terms of the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: This is a phenomenalist account of personal identity, so it has no independent account of the body apart from the contents of the mind. Personally I think we must distinguish 'central' mental events from 'peripheral' ones. |