Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'New System and Explanation of New System' and 'Critique of Pure Reason'
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21 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
5627
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I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant]
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
9751
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To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
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21450
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Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5583
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We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5570
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Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5551
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I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21452
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I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant]
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5582
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As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
2965
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For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
5549
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Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
5596
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We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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9756
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We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard]
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5597
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If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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