Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' and 'The Golden Bowl, and Lit as Moral Philosophy'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
11 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264
|
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
|
9266
|
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267
|
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
|
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
|
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20808
|
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
|
20835
|
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20836
|
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
|
21679
|
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
|
20837
|
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
|
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
|