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Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'When Does a Life Begin?' and 'Treatise of Human Nature'
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23 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3819
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Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
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1317
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A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
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1331
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The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
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1388
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Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
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21297
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A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
1316
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Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
1333
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Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume]
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1332
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We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume]
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21305
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Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]
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21307
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Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
21306
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Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
21294
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A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume]
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21295
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When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume]
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21298
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We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume]
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21304
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Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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