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'fragments/reports', 'What Numbers Are' and 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix'
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13 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5323
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Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
21311
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Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21312
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Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
21308
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We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
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21310
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Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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