Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Discourses', 'The Problem of the Soul' and 'Causal Powers'
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16 ideas
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
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5351
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We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
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5353
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The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan]
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5354
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We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
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5349
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For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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23329
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We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
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23342
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Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
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23330
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Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
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5338
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Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan]
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5344
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Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
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23332
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Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
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23331
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Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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23338
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You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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5332
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People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan]
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5345
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We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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20875
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If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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23347
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If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus]
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