Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'The Unimportance of Identity' and 'The Concept of a Person'
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8 ideas
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
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5514
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Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
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5665
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Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
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5666
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Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
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5521
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If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
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5522
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Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
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5519
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It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
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5520
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If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
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5669
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Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
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