display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form of dualism, but if we define it as the doctrine that conscious events are effects but not causes, it appears to be consistent with physicalism. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting. The theory was invented to put mind outside physics, and make the closure of physics possible. However, being capable of causing things seems to be a necessary condition for physical objects. An effect in one domain is a cause in another. |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
Full Idea: Advocates of the mind-body identity theory typically claimed that identity between particular mental states and brain states was contingent, until Kripke argued persuasively that identity is always necessary. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
A reaction: Kripke wanted to argue against the identity theory, but what he seems to have done is reformulate it into a much more powerful version (involving necessary identity). |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
Full Idea: The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.3) | |
A reaction: We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too. |