display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
Full Idea: The idea (of Dennett and others) is that recursive decomposition will eliminate the homunculi. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.VI) | |
A reaction: Lycan is the best exponent of this view, which I like. My brain clearly has a substantial homunculus which I call my PA; it regularly reminds of what I have to do in an hour's time. I am sure it is composed of smaller brain components working as a team. |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
Full Idea: Searle appears to argue that phenomenal consciousness is explained in biological terms, but that biological properties are irreducible to purely (micro)physical ones. | |
From: report of John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992]) by U Kriegel / K Williford - Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' n1 | |
A reaction: Searle is very hard to pin down, and this account suggests the reason very clearly - because he is proposing something which is bizarrely implausible. The reduction of biology-to-physics looks much more likely than consciousness-to-biology. |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
Full Idea: I hold a view of mind/brain relations that is a form of causal reduction (mental features are caused by biological processes), but does this imply ontological reduction? (…No!) | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.II.5) | |
A reaction: What exactly is his claim? Presumably 'causal reduction' implies identity of (philosophical) substance. This seems to imply 'emergence' in a rather old-fashioned and dramatic way, though elsewhere Searle denies this. |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
Full Idea: The same principle that implies multiple realisability would seem to imply universal realisability. …Any object whatever could have syntactical ascriptions made to it. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.V) | |
A reaction: This leads to rather weak reductio objections to functionalism. Logically there may be no restriction on how to implement a mind, but naturally there are very tight restrictions. Stick to neurons seems the best strategy. |