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2 ideas
| 2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Sense in the sentient, can be nothing else but motion in some of the internal parts of the sentient; and the parts so moved are parts of the organs of sense. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 3.15.02) | |
| A reaction: Amazingly bold for the time, and presumably influenced by Lucretius. I am sympathetic, but to suggest that sensation is nothing more sounds a bit like a category mistake. Has he grasped that the brain is involved? |
| 6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The concept of cause is what holds together our picture of the universe, a picture that would otherwise disintegrate into a diptych of the mental and the physical. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xi) | |
| A reaction: Davidson seems to be the one who put mental causation at the centre of philosophy. By then denying that there are any 'psycho-physical' laws, he seems to me to have re-opened the metaphysical gap he says he was trying to close. |