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2 ideas
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
Full Idea: It would be wrong to represent Descartes' view as the idea that bodies are made of one kind of stuff and minds of another; he did not think minds are made of stuff at all, because then they would be divisible. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. It could be an indivisible substance. Without a mental substance, Descartes may have to say the mind is an abstraction, perhaps a pattern of Platonic forms. |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
Full Idea: Functionalism holds that it is in the nature of certain mental states to have certain effects; therefore there can be no mental epiphenomena. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: I strongly resist the idea that a thing's identity is its function. Functionalism may not say that. Mind is an abstraction referring to a causal nexus of unknowable components. |