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4 ideas
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
Full Idea: The fundamental problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26) | |
A reaction: If footprints or tree-rings are the model for reductions of intentionality, there doesn't seem much scope in them for giving false information, except by some freak event. |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
Full Idea: According to property dualism, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even though they are properties of one substance. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: Two properties may be phenomenologically different (transparent and magnetic), but that doesn't put them in different ontological categories. |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
Full Idea: While the non-reductive physicalist believes that mental/physical supervenience must be explained, the emergentist is willing to accept it as a fact of nature. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: A good reason not to be an emergentist. No philosopher should abandon the principle of sufficient reason. |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
Full Idea: If the mental supervenes on the physical, then whenever a physical cause brings about some effect, a mental cause comes along for the ride. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: This is why supervenience seems to imply epiphenomenalism. The very concept of supervenience is dubious. |