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Ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Naming and Necessity lectures' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'

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8 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies

4967	It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Prima facie, it would seem that it is a least logically possible the brain state corresponding to pain should have existed (Jones's brain could have been in exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones feeling any pain at all.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: This is Kripke's commitment to the possibility of zombies, which are only possible if the mind-body connection is a contingent one, and he shows that there are no contingent 'identities'. The answer is necessary identity, and no zombies.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism

5493	If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
	Full Idea: Armstrong and Lewis said that mental items were defined in terms of typical causes and effects; if, as seems likely, research reveals that a particular causal niche is occupied by a physical state, it follows that pain is a physical state.
	From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.5
	A reaction: I am not fully convinced of the first step in the argument. It sounds like the epistemology and the ontology have got muddled (as usual). We define mental states as we define electrons, in terms of observed behaviour, but what are they?

4600	Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
	Full Idea: The Armstrong/Lewis version of functionalism takes mental properties to be functional properties, but identifies these with what other functionalists would regard as their realisers.
	From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by John Heil - Philosophy of Mind Ch.4
	A reaction: Heil rejects this, but I am beginning to think that this is the answer. If functions do not have an ontological life of their own (the 'ringing' of the bell), then functionalist mental states can't either. Function is not an ontological category.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

7430	Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
	Full Idea: In his attempted disproof of materialism about the mind, Kripke assumes that the physical description is a rigid designator, but this seems to be begging the question against the causal theory, which says the description is non-rigid.
	From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xiv
	A reaction: A crucial part of this is that Armstrong believes that the laws of nature are contingent, and hence mind-brain identity has to be. Personally I incline to say that the identity is rigid, but that Kripke is still wrong.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument

7867	If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Kripke's argument is that the possibility of conscious properties coming apart from material properties shows that they cannot be identical with material properties.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 3.3
	A reaction: A nice clear and simple summary. How can the possibility of coming apart be demonstrated? Only, it seems, by using our imaginations. But that is quite a good guide in areas we know well, but not in recondite areas like the brain.

3228	Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
	Full Idea: Kripke's argument against mind-brain identity is that a pain is necessarily pain (just as a stone is necessarily matter), but a brain state is not necessarily painful (just as a stone is not necessarily a doorstep).
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.6.2
	A reaction: As with Descartes' argument from necessity for dualism, this seems to me to beg the question. It seems to me fairly self-evident that certain brain states have to be painful, just as stones always have to be hard or massive.

5832	Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The identity theorist, it appears, can admit that the identity is necessary if true without substantially altering his position, but Kripke argues that the identity between pain and some brain states is not necessary.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3) by Stephen P. Schwartz - Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds §IV
	A reaction: This appears to depend on being able to imagine the pain occurring with a different brain state, or no brain state. Bad argument. See Idea 5819.

4968	Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
	Full Idea: The identity theorist is committed to the view that there could not be a C-fibre stimulation which was not a pain, nor a pain which was not a C-fibre stimulation; these consequences are certainly surprising and counterintuitive.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: If Kripke saw a glow in an area of his brain every time he felt a pain, he would cease to find it 'counterintuitive'. Far from this conclusion being 'surprising', its opposite is absurd. Pain with no brain event? C-fibres blaze away, and I feel nothing?