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2 ideas
18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
Full Idea: Connectionists typically do not distinguish between processes and memory stores, and, more importantly, it is unclear whether connectionists can draw a distinction between the knowledge stored in a concept and the background. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: In other words connectionism fails to capture the structured nature of our thinking. There is an innate structure (which, say I, should mainly be seen as 'mental files'). |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225) | |
A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious. |