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Ideas for 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics', 'Identity and Necessity' and 'fragments/reports'

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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
     Full Idea: The identity theorist has to hold that we are under some illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains without brain states.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190)
     A reaction: The origin of Robert Kirk's idea that there might be zombies. Kripke is wrong. Of course Kripke and his friends can imagine disembodied pains; the question is whether being able to imagine them makes them possible, which it doesn't.