display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: It is generally conceded by reductive physicalists that a state of the brain cannot be intrinsically about anything, for intentionality is not an intrinsic property of anything, so there can be no internal objects for a physicalist. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4) | |
A reaction: Perhaps it is best to say that 'aboutness' is not a property of physics. We may say that a brain state 'represents' something, because the something caused the brain state, but representations have to be recognised |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
Full Idea: If causation concerns events, then we have an identity theory of mental and physical events (particulars) [Davidson]. If causation is by properties, then it is mental and physical properties which are identical [Lewis and Armstrong]. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: Events are tokens, and properties are types. Tricky. Events are dynamic, but properties can be static. |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
Full Idea: Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.19) | |
A reaction: Certainly if the physical is seen as just a pile of atoms, it is hard to see how they could ever think (see idea 1909). |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
Full Idea: Causal overdetermination is when an effect has more than one cause, and each event would have caused the effect if the other one had not done so. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.13) | |
A reaction: Overdetermination is a symptom that an explanation is questionable, but it can occur. Two strong people can join to push over a light hatstand. |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
Full Idea: I claim that the completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.12) | |
A reaction: He does not convince me of this. The mind may be within physics, but why should we say a priori that no exceptions to physical law will ever be discovered. Crane is setting up straw men. |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
Full Idea: In experience we learn propositions, since someone can reason using the sentence 'Red looks like this' (e.g. 'If red looks like this, then either it looks like this to dogs or it doesn't'). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28) | |
A reaction: The fact that we can create propositions about experiences doesn't prove that experience is inherently propositional. |