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Ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Naming and Necessity lectures' and 'How Things Persist'

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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
     Full Idea: Prima facie, it would seem that it is a least logically possible the brain state corresponding to pain should have existed (Jones's brain could have been in exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones feeling any pain at all.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
     A reaction: This is Kripke's commitment to the possibility of zombies, which are only possible if the mind-body connection is a contingent one, and he shows that there are no contingent 'identities'. The answer is necessary identity, and no zombies.