display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
Full Idea: Functionalism has been rejuvenated by being joined to externalist causal theories of reference. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 2.VIII) | |
A reaction: This, however, seems to be roughly the reason why Putnam gave up his functionalist theory. See Ideas 2332 and 2071. However the causal network of mind can incorporate environmental features. |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
Full Idea: A computer, me for example, could run the steps in the program for some mental capacity, such as understanding Chinese, without understanding a word of Chinese. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.II) | |
A reaction: I don't think this is true. I could recite a bit of Chinese without comprehension, but giving flexible answers to complex questions isn't plausible just by gormlessly implementing a procedure. |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
Full Idea: Most of the works I have seen in the computational theory of the mind commit some variation on the homunculus fallacy. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.VI) | |
A reaction: This will be because there is an unspoken user for the inner computer. But see Fodor's view (Idea 2506). The key idea here is Dennett's: that not all regresses are vicious. My mind controller isn't like all of me. |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
Full Idea: If the brain is a digital computer, we are still faced with the question 'Who is the user?' | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.VI) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. Our whole current concept of a computer involves the unmentioned user. We don't have to go all mystical about persons, though. Robots aren't logically impossible. |