display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
Full Idea: Most neurons, it has been said, are pretty much alike and largely interchangeable. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 76) | |
A reaction: This fact, if true, is highly significant, because the correct theory of the mind must therefore be some sort of functionalism. If what a neuron is is insignificant, then what it does must be what matters. |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
Full Idea: Machine functionalism requires a mental state to be a physical realisation of a Turing machine; causal-theoretical functionalism only requires that there be appropriate "internal states". | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.112) | |
A reaction: Searle's objection to the Turing machine version seems good - that such a machine has an implicit notion of a user/interpreter, which is absent from this theory of mind. |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is by no means clear that any human could manage to do what Searle imagines himself to be doing in the Chinese Room - that is, short of throwing away the rule book and learning some real Chinese. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.100) | |
A reaction: It is not clear how a rule book could contain answers to an infinity of possible questions. The Chinese Room is just a very poor analogy with what is envisaged in the project of artificial intelligence. |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
Full Idea: On the functionalist account of mental properties, just where does a mental property get its causal powers? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
A reaction: That is the key problem. Something can only have a function if it has intrinsic powers (corkscrews are rigid and helix-shaped). It can't be irrelevant that pain hurts. |