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3 ideas
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
Full Idea: If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II) | |
A reaction: Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though. |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
Full Idea: There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible. |
20656 | Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson] |
Full Idea: One development in particular in the 1950s helped to discredit the traditional concept of the mind. This was medical drugs that influenced the workings of the brain. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 16 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This explains Ryle's 1949 book, and the Australian physicalists emerging in the late 1950s. Philosophers don't grasp how their subject is responsive to other areas of human knowledge. Of course, opium had always done this. |