display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Type physicalism is, roughly, the doctrine that psychological kinds are identical to neurological kinds. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App A n.1) | |
A reaction: This gets my general support, leaving open the nature of 'kinds'. Presumably the identity is strict, as in 'Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus'. It seems unlikely that if you and I think the 'same' thought, that we have strictly identical brain states. |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
Full Idea: Advocates of the mind-body identity theory typically claimed that identity between particular mental states and brain states was contingent, until Kripke argued persuasively that identity is always necessary. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
A reaction: Kripke wanted to argue against the identity theory, but what he seems to have done is reformulate it into a much more powerful version (involving necessary identity). |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
Full Idea: What Hume didn't see was that the causal and representational properties of mental symbols have somehow to be coordinated if the coherence of mental life is to be accounted for. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: Certainly the idea that it all somehow becomes magic at the point where the brain represents the world is incoherent - but it is a bit magical. How can the whole of my garden be in my brain? Weird. |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
Full Idea: The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.3) | |
A reaction: We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too. |