display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
Full Idea: Fodor holds that beliefs are brain states or processes, but picked out at a 'higher' or 'special science' level. | |
From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.82 | |
A reaction: I don't think you can argue with this. Levels of physical description exist (e.g. pure physics tells you nothing about the weather), and I think 'process' is the best word for the mind (Idea 4931). |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
Full Idea: There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible. |