display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is possible to hold that phenomenal properties (qualia) are irreducible, while holding intentional properties, including propositional attitudes, to be reducible (functionally, or biologically). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.017) | |
A reaction: This is the position which Kim has settled for, but I find it baffling. If the universe is full of irreducibles that is one thing, but if everything in the universe is reducible except for one tiny item, that is implausible. |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
Full Idea: The emergentism (of Searle), like ethical intuitionism, views mind-body supervenience as something that admits no explanation - it is a brute fact. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.013) | |
A reaction: This is why 'emergence' is no sort of theory, and is really old-fashioned dualism in a dubious naturalistic disguise. If mind 'emerges', there is presumably a causal mechanism for that. |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
Full Idea: If emergentism is correct about anything, it is more likely to be correct about qualia than about anything else. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.103) | |
A reaction: I'm puzzled by a view that says that nearly all of the mind is reducible, but one tiny aspect of it is 'emergent'. What sort of ontology is envisaged by that? |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers saw in mind-body supervenience a satisfying metaphysical statement of physicalism without reductionism. This widely influential position is now known as "nonreductive physicalism". | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.008) | |
A reaction: If two things supervene on one another, then we should be asking why. Occasionalism and Parallelism are presumably not the answer. Coldness supervenes on ice. |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
Full Idea: Maybe strong supervenience is inconsistent with the irreducibility of the supervenient properties to their subvenient bases. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.012) | |
A reaction: If two things are really very very supervenient on one another (superdupervenient?), then you have to ask WHY? If there isn't identity, then there is surely a highly lawlike connection? |