display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
Full Idea: Logical behaviourism says any meaningful statement about mental phenomena can be translated without loss of content into a statement solely about behavioural and physical phenomena. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 29) | |
A reaction: Also called analytical behaviourism. If we are supposed to infer the ontology of mental states from language, this makes me cross. Maybe we only discuss mentality in behavioural terms because we are epistemologically, and hence linguistically, limited. |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
Full Idea: Behaviourism can be considered as an attempt to reduce the mental to the physical via definitional bridge principles (every mental expression being given a behavioural definition). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.217) | |
A reaction: Effectively these would (if they had been discoverable) have been the elusive psycho-physical laws (which Davidson says do not exist). The objection to behaviourism is precisely that there is no fixed behaviour attached to a given mental state. |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Functionalists take a "realist" approach to dispositions whereas the behaviourist embraces an "instrumentalist" line. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 78) | |
A reaction: A helpful distinction, which immediately shows why functionalism is superior to behaviourism. There must be some explanation of mental dispositions, and the instrumental view is essentially a refusal to think about the real problem. |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
Full Idea: If it is an analytic truth that anyone in pain has a tendency to wince or groan, what about snakes? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 37) | |
A reaction: Snakes do, however, exhibit what looks like 'I really don't like that' behaviour, and their rapid avoidance movements are identical to ours. On the other hand, I'm not quite sure what a snake does what it has a stomach upset. I see Kim's point. |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mind-to-behaviour connections are always defeasible - by the occurrence of a further mental state. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 35) | |
A reaction: But then an object's falling under gravity is always defeasible, by someone catching it first. This popular idea is meant to show that there could, as Davidson puts it, 'no psycho-physical laws', but I suspect the laws are just complex, like weather laws. |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
Full Idea: The factors that determine exactly what you are doing when you produce a physical gesture include the customs, habits and conventions that are in force, so it is unlikely that anyone could produce correct behavioural definitions of mental terms. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 36) | |
A reaction: This problem can be added to the problem that it is hard to specify behaviour without reference to mentalistic terms. The point is clearly right, as what I am doing when I wave my hand in the air will depend on all sorts of conventions and expectations. |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Is there even a loosely definable range of bodily behaviour that is characteristically exhibited by people when they believe, say, that there is no largest prime number? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 32) | |
A reaction: This is a highly persuasive argument against behaviourism. Very abstract and theoretical thoughts have no related behaviour, especially among non-mathematicians. I probably believe this idea about numbers, but I can't think what to do about it. |