display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: I claim that conscious experience arises from fine-grained functional organisation….. we might call it 'non-reductive functionalism'. | |
| From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 3.7.1) | |
| A reaction: This is Chalmers' final position. If consciousness is 'emergent' and cannot be reduced, what has fine-grained got to do with it? I take 'fine-grained' to be a hint at why the brain becomes conscious. Fine-grained functions cause something. |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: Opponents typically reply to Searle's argument by conceding that the person in the room does not understand Chinese, and arguing that the understanding should instead be attributed to the system consisting of the person and the pieces of paper. | |
| From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 4.9.4) | |
| A reaction: Searle himself spotted this reply. It seems plausible to say that a book contains 'understanding', so the translation dictionary may have it. A good Room would cope with surprise questions. |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: While it may be intuitively implausible that Block's 'mind' made of the population of China would give rise to conscious experience, it is equally intuitively implausible that a brain should give rise to experience. | |
| From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 3.7.2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like good support for functionalism, but I am more inclined to see it as a critique of 'intuition' as a route to truth where minds are concerned. Intuition isn't designed for that sort of work. |