display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
Full Idea: Searle argues that H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about liquidity. | |
From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.4.1) | |
A reaction: Good! |
2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
Full Idea: It remains plausible that consciousness arises from a physical basis, even though it is not entailed by that basis. | |
From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.4.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I find this totally implausible. Since every other property or process in the known universe seems to be entailed by its physical basis, I don't expect the mind to be an exception. |
2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
Full Idea: It seems logically possible that a creature physically identical to a conscious creature might have no conscious experiences (a zombie)…so conscious experience supervenes naturally but not logically on the physical. | |
From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 1.2.1) | |
A reaction: "It seems possible" isn't much of an argument. This claim by Chalmers has been a great incentive to reassess what is or isn't possible. Can a brain lack consciousness? Can a tree fall over silently? Can cyanide stop poisoning us? |
9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
Full Idea: In Chalmers's non-reductive theory, phenomenal consciousness is treated as a fundamental feature of the world, that cannot be explained in nonphenomenal terms. Theory is still possible, in the regularities of interaction. | |
From: report of David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996]) by U Kriegel / K Williford - Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' n2 | |
A reaction: I can't make much sense of this view without a backing of panpsychism. How could a 'fundamental' feature of reality only begin to appear when life evolves on one particular planet? But 'panpsychism' is a warning of big misunderstandings. See Idea 2424. |
2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
Full Idea: It is consistent with the physical facts about a mouse that it has conscious experiences, and it is consistent with the physical facts that it does not. | |
From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.3.1.4) | |
A reaction: No. It is consistent with our KNOWLEDGE of a mouse that it may or may not be conscious. I take this to be the key error of Chalmers, which led him to the mistaken idea that zombies are possible. The usual confusion of ontology and epistemology…. |