Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Naming and Necessity lectures' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'
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8 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
4967
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It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
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If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
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Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
7867
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If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
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3228
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Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
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5832
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Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
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4968
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Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
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