Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Philosophical Naturalism' and 'Naming and Necessity lectures'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
|
4967
|
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
|
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
|
3513
|
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
|
3514
|
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
|
3511
|
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
|
|
3510
|
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
|
7430
|
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
|
|
3515
|
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
|
3512
|
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
|
7867
|
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
|
|
3228
|
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
|
|
5832
|
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
|
|
4968
|
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
|