Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Mind in a Physical World', 'Primary Truths' and 'On the Nature of the Universe'
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15 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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5695
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Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
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5711
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The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius]
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5712
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Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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2324
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Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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2314
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Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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2313
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Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
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2328
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The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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2309
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Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
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2311
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Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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5719
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The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius]
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5724
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Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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5713
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You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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2308
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Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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2327
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Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
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