Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Philosophy of Mind', 'fragments/reports' and 'Davidson on himself'

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33 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3409 Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
3399 If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3390 Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
3414 What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
3359 Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
3369 Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
3428 Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
3380 Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3371 Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
3372 Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
3373 Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
3370 What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
3379 Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
3388 Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
3384 The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
3393 How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
3439 Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
3427 Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
3376 We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
3424 Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
3362 Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
3413 Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3374 Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3433 The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3377 Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
3438 Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
3440 Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
3375 If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]