Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Philosophy of Mind', 'fragments/reports' and 'Davidson on himself'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
11 ideas
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
|
3964
|
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
|
|
3439
|
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
|
|
3427
|
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
|
3965
|
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
|
|
3961
|
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
|
|
3963
|
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
|
3966
|
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
|
|
3376
|
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
|
|
3424
|
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
|
3362
|
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
|
|
3413
|
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
|