Combining Texts
Ideas for
'From an Ontological Point of View', 'A Realist Theory of Science' and 'Daniel Dennett on himself'
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9 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
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Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
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Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
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The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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7043
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Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
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