Combining Texts
Ideas for
'From an Ontological Point of View', '02: Gospel of St Mark' and 'The Conscious Mind'
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21 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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2409
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Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
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2411
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Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
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2424
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It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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2413
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If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
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7061
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Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
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7063
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Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
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7064
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Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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7027
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Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
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2417
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Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
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2428
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Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
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7062
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Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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2406
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H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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2405
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Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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2395
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Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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9318
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Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
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2404
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Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
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7059
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The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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7012
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If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2429
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Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
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7043
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Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
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