Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)', 'Troubles with Functionalism' and 'Mind in a Physical World'
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17 ideas
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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2574
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Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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2324
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Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
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2576
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In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
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2575
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Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
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2583
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You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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2578
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Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
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2585
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Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
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2586
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In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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2314
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Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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2313
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Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
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2328
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The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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2309
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Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
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2311
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Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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2308
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Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
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2579
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Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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2327
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Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
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