Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Problem of the Soul', 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' and 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed)'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
13 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
|
6625
|
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
|
5343
|
People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan]
|
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
|
5347
|
Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
|
|
6621
|
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
|
6654
|
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
|
6629
|
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
|
|
6623
|
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
|
|
6628
|
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
|
5339
|
Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
|
6622
|
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
|
6634
|
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
|
5342
|
Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan]
|
|
6630
|
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
|