Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Thinking About Mathematics', 'The Problem of the Soul' and 'Philosophy of Mind'
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19 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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4590
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If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
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5343
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People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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4614
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Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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5347
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Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
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4595
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No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
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4599
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Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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4624
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If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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4601
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Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil]
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4602
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Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
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5339
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Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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4593
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'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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4597
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Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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5342
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Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan]
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4609
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It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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4596
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The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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4598
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Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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4619
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'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
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4620
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Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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4594
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A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]
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