Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Elements of Mind', 'Internal and External Reasons' and 'fragments/reports'
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11 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
4069
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Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4074
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Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
4091
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The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
4070
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Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
4084
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Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
4080
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If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
4075
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Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
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4085
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Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
4073
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Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
4072
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The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
4094
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Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
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