Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Elements of Mind', 'The Nature of Mental States' and 'Taking Rights Seriously'
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19 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
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4069
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Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
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4074
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Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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2590
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Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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2591
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Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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2588
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Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
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2589
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Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
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2592
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Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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4091
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The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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4070
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Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
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2587
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Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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4084
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Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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4080
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If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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4075
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Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
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4085
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Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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4073
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Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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4072
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The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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6376
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Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
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2330
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If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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4094
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Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
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