Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Elements of Mind', 'Constitutional Code I' and 'First Things First'

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11 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
4069 Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4074 Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
4091 The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
4070 Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
4084 Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
4080 If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
4075 Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
4085 Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
4073 Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
4072 The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
4094 Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]