display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The ancestor and chief rival of the language-of-thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas - that thoughts are about what they are about because they resemble their objects. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: When you place them side by side, neither seems quite right. How can a mental state resemble an object, and how can an inner language inherently capture the features of an object? Maybe we lack the words for the correct theory. |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
Full Idea: One powerful argument for a thesis that one notion is conceptually prior to another is the possibility of defining the first without reference to the second. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: You'd better check whether you can't also define the second without reference to the first before you rank their priority. And maybe 'conceptual priority' is conceptually prior to 'definition' (i.e. definition needs a knowledge of priority). Help! |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
Full Idea: An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: One might still have to decide priority between two equally simple (or complex) concepts. I begin to wonder whether 'priority' has any other than an instrumental meaning (according to which direction you wish to travel - is London before Edinburgh?). |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
Full Idea: A dog cannot consider its concepts. Concepts are not things in a dog's world in the way that cats are. Concepts are things in our world, because we have language. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Dogs must have concepts, though, or much of their behaviour (like desperation to go for a walk, or to eat) is baffling. This is as good a proposal as I have ever encountered for the value of language. Meta-thought is a huge evolutionary advantage. |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To recognise abstract terms as perfectly proper items of a vocabulary depends upon allowing that all that is necessary for the lawful introduction of a range of expressions into the language is a coherent account of how they are to function in sentences. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.16) | |
A reaction: Why can't the 'coherent account' of the sentences include the fact that there must be something there for the terms to refer to? How else are we to eliminate nonsense words which obey good syntactical rules? Cf. Idea 9872. |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
Full Idea: Dummett uses the term 'logical abstraction' for the construction of the abstract objects as equivalence classes, but it is not clear why we should call this construction 'logical'. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991]) by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind n 14 | |
A reaction: This is a good objection, and Tait offers a much better notion of 'logical abstraction' (as involving preconditions for successful inference), in Idea 9981. |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: We arrive at the concept of suicide by considering both occurrences in the sentence 'Cato killed Cato' of the proper name 'Cato' as simultaneously replaceable by another name, say 'Brutus', and so apprehending the pattern common to both sentences. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This is intended to illustrate Frege's 'logical abstraction' technique, as opposed to wicked psychological abstraction. The concept of suicide is the pattern 'x killed x'. This is a crucial example if we are to understand abstraction... |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To get units by abstraction, units arrived at by abstraction from forks must the identical to that abstracted from spoons, with no trace of individuality. But if spoons can no longer be differentiated from forks, they can't differ from one another either. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Dummett makes the point better than Frege did. Can we 'think of a fork insofar as it is countable, ignoring its other features'? What are we left thinking of? Frege says it must still be the whole fork. 'Nice fork, apart from the colour'. |