Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Truth' and 'Elements of Mind'

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4 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial'
     A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived.
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
     Full Idea: The Twin Earth argument does not refute internalism, since it depends on the 'Content-Determines-Reference' principle, which internalists can reject.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.37)
     A reaction: The idea is that content should be understood in a context (e.g. on a particular planet). Indexicals count against a totally narrow view of content (Twins thinking 'I am here').
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
     Full Idea: If a mental state is broad, then the existence of the mental state entails the existence of its object.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7)
     A reaction: Hence thinking of non-existent things like unicorns is problematic for externalists. However, externalists can think about numbers or Platonic ideals.
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane]
     Full Idea: Intensional contexts are those where truth or falsehood depends on the way the extensions are conceived.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.4)
     A reaction: An important distinction for anyone defending an internalist view of concepts or of knowledge